
Taking
Ownership of Human Rights
Towards a
maturing Dutch Caribbean.
Presentation by
the Hon. Mr Justice Jacob Wit
Judge of the
Caribbean Court of Justice
At the occasion
of the launch of the Dutch Caribbean Human Rights
Committee
University of
the Netherlands Antilles | Curaçao, October 18, 2007

Distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen,
We are
living in interesting times. Under our very eyes the
constitutional structures of our islands are being
changed. Only a few of us, however, are involved in that
process. Most of us are looking on from the sideline and
are wondering what will come of this.
I will
argue that if there ever was a time for the citizens of
these isles to get involved in the political processes
of our societies that time is now. I am of course not
talking about party politics, although that is also
necessary, but about politics in a much broader sense.
Democratic governance is no longer limited (if it ever
was) to the right to vote as it now has been widely
accepted that it also embraces both the rule of law and
the right to participation in the political process
including, besides the right to vote, also the rights of
assembly, association and expression. The latter
includes of course the right to have free, independent
and pluralistic media.
It is in
this context that the launch of the Dutch Caribbean
Human Rights Committee (DCHRC) fits in nicely. Indeed,
here we are, assembled, celebrating the birth of a new
association in the presence of the press that, although
not without faults, is still free, independent and
pluralistic.
My point of
departure is that for many years now the Dutch Caribbean
peoples have been living in a stage of constitutional
and societal adolescence; that, from a constitutional
point of view, for far too long, we have been lingering
in a protracted age of puberty. The time has come, it
seems to me, to grow up and mature. But we have to act
and speak now, or, as they say, for ever hold our
tongue.
Our local
politics have generally not been of a level that could
be appraised as satisfactory. As a whole, the quality of
politics has deteriorated substantially. Apart from
incidental cases of rampant corruption, our political
directorate has been behaving as the proverbial student,
living in lodgings paid for by his parents, regularly
and irregularly asking them for some more money during
the course of the month and taking his dirty laundry
home every weekend for his mother to clean them; the
same student who, when his mother cautiously seeks to
convince him to act more responsibly and behave
properly, will defiantly tell her that she should not
meddle in his private affairs as he is now an adult who
knows how to take care of himself and who knows his
rights. Of course, Mother also has her own agenda (as
people usually have).
However, it
would not be totally fair to put all the blame on the
politicians. After all, we are the ones who elected them
and we are the ones who gave them a free hand. And it is
certainly true that in our small scale island societies,
politicians are regularly being pressured by
individuals, groups or even society as a whole to
provide for certain things even while we all know very
well that there is no money to do so.
One of the
idiosyncrasies of our postcolonial arrangements with the
Mother country is that we are living in our own
constitutional fairy tale portraying ourselves as full
members of one (almost) imaginary Kingdom, consisting of
three separate but equal countries all sublimated into a
constitutional Trinity the mysterious structure of which
is enshrined in a document of quasi-sacred character:
the Charter of the Kingdom. This “one but three, three
but one” construction, once, aptly I think, described by
me as “a paradigm of Dutch pragmatism, neither troubled
by constitutional logic nor constitutional principles”
has caused much havoc in our relations with The
Netherlands as it has blurred our (and their) vision on
the realities of our constitutional situation.
There seems
to exist a tendency among the politicians on both sides
of the Atlantic, only when it suits their purposes of
course, to invoke the magic words “We are all Dutch!”
and “We all belong to the same Kingdom!” This has
brought Dutch politicians to criticize, e.g., the poor
state of our prisons and the appalling poverty that
exists in some parts of our islands. By using the
incantation “How is this possible in our own Kingdom?”
they justify their stance to chastise our politicians
for not keeping our prisons up to standards and for not
alleviating the fate of our poor. The same rhetorical
device, however, has sometimes been used by our own
politicians in seeking to obtain for their people the
extravaganza of certain benefits which do exist in The
Netherlands (like relatively copious social security
allowances).
In both
cases the answer has predictably been: yes we are one,
but this particular matter falls squarely and clearly
outside the competence of the Kingdom and should
therefore be deemed an internal affair which has to be
dealt with by the respective countries themselves. In
other words “Mind your own business!” Add to that the
fact that our beloved Kingdom has no Parliament, no
juridical personality (meaning that it cannot be sued),
and no money, and you might understand why I just spoke
of an “almost imaginary Kingdom.”
I should
also point out that the very word “Dutch” has a double
meaning which renders sometimes true and sometimes not
the submission that we are all Dutch. On the one hand,
being Dutch means that one is a Dutch citizen or has the
Dutch nationality (which is certainly true). But it
might also mean that one belongs to the Dutch people in
a social, cultural and often ethnic sense (which is not
true).
That is why we still distinguish “Yu’i Korsou” and
“Macamba” although rare cases of transformation from one
into the other have been reported. As a rule, the
European Dutch are always Dutch and the Caribbean Dutch
are only Dutch in one sense, an incongruity that lays at
the root of problems that have either manifested
themselves already or are still looming in the dark. At
any rate, this form of “double Dutch” has been a source
of many false and consequently unfulfilled expectations.
All of
these factors and many more, have contributed to the
mess that our public finances and the general state of
our Dutch Caribbean countries are currently in. And in
the midst of the turmoil caused by debts of breathtaking
magnitude and clear examples of political mismanagement,
we find ourselves now in the process of restructuring
our constitutional positions as Curaçao and St Maarten
are seeking to obtain “country status” comparable to
that of Aruba, and the other three islands are aiming to
be fully “integrated” in The Netherlands, a position
that seems untenable to me as is already becoming clear
from what we have seen thus far. As I see it, the
creation of these so-called BES islands only adds
another layer of obscurity to the already impenetrable
and multi-interpretable structure and content of our
Kingdom Charter, a characteristic which I suppose it
shares with other “sacred” texts.
What does
all this has to do with human rights, you will ask.
Well, everything, I would say, as I am now about to
explain.
The
restructuring of the Netherlands Antilles is all about
the furthering of a fundamental right its inhabitants
have: the right to self-determination, which is the very
first right mentioned in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a Human Rights
Treaty to which we are a Party.
As it was
felt by a vast majority of our peoples that the old
structure of the Netherlands Antilles is no longer
helpful to our advancement as a people but, indeed, more
of an impediment to our future development, and as this
was finally recognized by the Mother country at yonder
side of the Atlantic, we have embarked on a series of
negotiations and meetings of all sorts to achieve these
goals.
Initially,
the demands from this side of the Kingdom were of a
level that did not reflect much understanding of the
nature of this process. Especially Curaçao was clear and
simple in its wishes: they wanted nothing less, and
maybe a little bit more, than the separate status Aruba
already has. St Maarten, having much more to gain in
comparison with Curaçao, which after all already has the
seat of the central government, was a little less robust
and one could say more cautious in its demands.
Nevertheless, the discussion took place on a level of
“we want our own this, and we want our own that.” As
such, there is nothing wrong with this. In a sense it
flows from the concept of equal treatment and it also
appeals to something that is deeply felt by all and
sundry. In the words of John Stuart Mill:
“If a
person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense
and experience, his own mode of laying out his
existence is the best, not because it is the best in
itself, but because it is his own mode.”
That is
true of course, but it is not the whole truth. Things
are usually more complicated than that. There is now I
think a growing tendency in international law to
circumscribe the right to self-determination in the
sense that an intended disintegration of a country
should not lead to instability or to a substantial lower
level of well-being or a loss or deterioration of
governmental quality in terms of essential elements like
the rule of law, democracy, good governance and human
rights.
In that light it is understandable that the Dutch
government has offered substantial financial relief to
the islands in order to bring the total debt in the
public sector down to a level where it can be managed.
In fact, it would have been irresponsible of them to
agree with the process of dismantlement of the
Netherlands Antilles if they had not offered this relief
without which the new entities would not be viable or
would at least not be able to maintain a sufficient
level of wellbeing and democratic governance for their
peoples. Although it is theoretically possible to make a
distinction between the constitutional restructuring of
the Antilles and the financial restructuring of its
public sector(s), realistically and from the view of
international law it would seem to me that these
processes are inextricably linked.
Now,
Holland would not be Holland if it would have simply
given us the money to pay off the debts without any
further conditions. Nobody would expect that and from
the view that countries, like people, have to mature
(which usually means learning it the hard way) this
would have been a very unwise thing to do. So, there is
really no objection against imposing conditions as such
and neither can one object to the fact that a lot of
bickering is going on now with respect to the question
of what these conditions should entail and to exactly
what extent. That is simply all in the game.
That the
Dutch government is seeking to institutionalize some
form of supervision on our politicians as to their way
of managing our public finances in order to avoid a
reoccurrence of the financial mess we have seen emerge,
seems to be in keeping with the overriding
responsibility which they, wearing the mantle of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, still have. I do not have a
problem with that. Where they seem to go wrong, however,
is the way in which they apparently seek to establish
that supervision as they seem bent to take that
responsibility permanently out of our hands.
Understandably, the approach from our side has been to
resist them as much as possible in an effort to give
away as little “autonomy” as possible. But whose
autonomy are we talking about? It is as though the
autonomy that is being pursued is nothing else than the
privilege of our politicians to do what they want and
this is of course very problematic.
In my view,
both approaches are to be deplored. Going back to the
basics
we have to be mindful that this whole enterprise of
constitutional restructuring should be aimed at
furthering the right to self-determination of us, the
Dutch Caribbean peoples. At the same time we should be
mindful of the fact that this is not a right per se but
one that implies a duty for us to foster in a meaningful
way the high ideals of democratic governance.
If we only
focus on the external outline of our new constitutional
arrangements, let’s say a separate status similar to
that of Aruba, we would have achieved very little
because internally, and thus basically, everything would
stay the same. In order to mature in the big bad world
of today one needs to take responsibility for those
things that matter. One cannot claim the right to stand
on ones own two feet whilst staying in bed. One has to
get up and stand. The right to carry responsibility for
ones own affairs, therefore, implies that one starts
carrying that responsibility. Even if it were true that
“Mother knows best” we cannot accept that “Mommy” will
take care of us to eternity. And so, any arrangement
that sees to it that Mother will for ever be in charge
of our affairs will reduce us to eternal adolescents,
pitiful creatures indeed. This would be a violation of
our right to human dignity which is I think the most
fundamental right there is.
What are we
to do to avoid this impending violation? My answer is
that we have to start behaving as adults. We have to
take our fate in our own hands even though, for the time
being at least, we will stay within the confines of our
almost imaginary Kingdom which, by the way, is still
real enough to produce both limitations and benefits for
us.
Experience
has taught us that the ideals of democratic and proper
governance are still very far away from our daily
realities. This is so because we never considered these
ideals to be really ours. In our sometimes petty way of
looking at things we thought of them as “belonging to
another world.” And in a way we still do. Very often one
hears politicians and citizens alike complaining about
these inconvenient “human rights” that only seem to
favour criminals. And in times of emerging crime waves
even politicians who should know better are eager to
promote the idea of declaring some state of emergency in
which we could then easily limit or do away with “this
foolishness of human rights.”
Nevertheless, we all understand that we cannot escape
the consequences of these fundamental rights as they are
laid down in the many treaties to which we are a Party
and we are probably aware that many of these rights, as
a consequence of our “monist” approach of international
law, have a direct effect on our local legal system even
to such extent that they can be used to set aside the
application of our domestic laws. Be that as it may,
these human rights, although more and more applied,
still seem very often “foreign” to us. Contributing to
that feeling perhaps is the fact that the signing of
these treaties have mostly been initiated by the Mother
country and that they, after reluctantly being approved
by us, are usually being applied by the judges most of
whom are of European stock.
It would
seem to me that what we have to do is to rethink our
constitutional position ourselves. We’ll have to find
our own mode of laying out our existence. And so, we
have to refocus on our own Constitution (Staatsregeling).
This should be our own sacred text in which we lay down
what we stand for and what we think our country should
strive for. This should be our founding document in
which we enshrine the cohesive principles of democracy,
good governance and the rule of law ensuring a
government of laws, not of men. This should be the
basic text by which we seek to define, in the words of
Dr R. Martha, the “strategic goals”
of our little island nations and by which we internalize
those human rights that we hold dear and consider
fundamental for our identity and our development, thus
taking ownership of those very rights.
It is true
that we have a draft constitution for Curaçao. But I am
afraid that that document is as unsatisfactory as it is
uninspiring. In fact, one could argue that it is
worthless, although I would not want to go as far as
that. Basically, it is not much more than a redraft of
the existing constitution of the Netherlands Antilles.
Now, it is true that in this draft one can find a number
of fundamental rights, but the problem is that these are
mere clones from those mentioned in the Dutch
constitution a document that has made itself virtually
irrelevant
due to the fact that it prohibits the judiciary to
review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament which
means that the Dutch constitution cannot fully be
enforced. Following the example of the Aruba
Constitution the Curaçao draft does make it possible for
the courts to review legislation against the background
of the 17 classical fundamental rights mentioned in the
draft but, as I will shortly set out, this is far from
satisfactory.
Let me
first say this. The Dutch constitutional model is not
suited for the Dutch Caribbean. It may be a good model
for Holland (although even there that is being
disputed), but it is not good for our small scale
societies. The Dutch parliamentary system has been
effective in Holland because, at least in the past, the
Dutch parliamentarians had enough integrity and
knowledge to carry that system. Experience has taught us
however that this is not the case with us. The Dutch
position that we as citizens of the Dutch Caribbean have
to be protected against the possible excesses of our
very own politicians is correct.
The
solution to that problem, however, is not to give the
Dutch politicians and bureaucrats the power to supervise
our politicians and bureaucrats. The solution lies with
us. We the citizens of these islands must have more
tools to keep our politicians in check. And these tools
should be provided by our Constitution. The solution is
to adopt a constitution that is truly the supreme law of
the land and to charge our judiciary with the duty to
uphold that Constitution entirely (not just a part of
it) so as to offer us the full protection of the law.
This is not
to give more power to the judges or to establish
judicial supremacy but simply to give power to the
people themselves. After all, even under a constitution
that is supreme and wholly reviewable the initiative to
take steps against the government of the day lies not in
the hands of the judges but in those of the citizens
themselves. Giving ourselves these powerful means to
reign in our politicians will ensure as much as possible
the full enforcement of our constitution and will keep
our politicians focused on the fact that they are
serving us and not themselves. That being said, we will
have to start looking at the content of our constitution
in a very different way.
I will give
you a few examples of what I am talking about. Our draft
constitution provides for a General Chamber of Audit and
an Ombudsman, both institutions designed to monitor and
possibly correct the executive government. However,
these provisions are virtually meaningless without an
additional provision demanding an efficient output from
these institutions and ensuring that the government
provides them with sufficient means, financial and
otherwise, to discharge their duties in a proper and
timely manner.
But even if such a provision is made, it would still be
irrelevant if it could not be enforced if and when the
government failed to comply.
Another
example. At the presentation of the draft constitution
it was proudly announced that section 81 of the draft
requires the government to present to the parliament a
yearly so-called balanced budget. According to paragraph
2 of that section the budget will have to be prepared in
accordance with norms that will be established by law.
If you think that such a provision would be able to stop
the government from messing up our public finances ever
again, you are wrong. In the first place, the fact that
the budget will be prepared according to norms we do not
yet know and which can be established with a simple
majority in parliament does not sound very reassuring.
Secondly, even if the government would bluntly present
an unbalanced budget, probably claiming force majeur,
this would have no effect whatsoever, because when
constitutional review is not possible – as would be the
case under the draft constitution – ordinances
(statutes) that violate the constitution cannot be
struck down. The budget of course is established by
ordinance.
A last
example. Very often the constitution demands that
certain important matters be laid down in formal
legislation usually by or pursuant to an ordinance.
However, if the constitution does not allow for full
judicial review and if the government and the parliament
have not complied with the constitutional requirement of
making the law, nothing can be done. In that case the
courts are powerless to enforce the constitution and to
order the government to introduce a Bill in parliament.
A
constitution such as proposed by the draft is nothing
more than a harmless symbol, an ineffectual play thing
for stir-eyed idealists, philosophers and smart
politicians.
I would
respectfully submit to you that we do not need that kind
of constitution and we should not want it either. I
would go even further. If this draft becomes our
constitution, we will have failed miserably in
developing our right to self-determination. I would even
submit that in that case we would not deserve to call
ourselves autonomous, whatever the arrangements with the
mother country.
If,
however, we would embrace the constitution as our
supreme law with full judicial review – as, by the way,
St. Maarten has done – then we would be required to have
a much closer look at our constitution before we adopt
it. When we realize that anything we lay down in the
constitution could some day be enforced by the
judiciary, going even as far as striking down newly
adopted legislation as unconstitutional or ordering the
government to present legislation to the parliament, it
will make us pause when we draft the constitutional
duties of the governmental departments and the
fundamental rights we want our citizens to have. Indeed,
it is then that we cannot afford to sprinkle our
constitution with fancy ideals and hollow phrases
anymore.
We will have to be very precise.
Our new
constitution should not only be a supreme document, it
should also, as I said before, be a defining document.
This means that we will have to make a decision as to
which of the many human rights that exist in the world
we want to enshrine in our constitution. Because by
enshrining them we will take ownership of them.
In the
first place we will have to look at the human rights
that already have legal effect in our jurisdictions. But
we should not necessarily stop there. For example, the
African Charter of Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights
mentions the right of all peoples to have “a general
satisfactory environment favorable to their
development.”(article 24). This is the only human rights
treaty I know of, that does so. I would like to think
that the environment is a very important issue for
Caribbean islands, not only because their livelihood
is at stake (think of coral reefs, tourism and
fisheries), but also because it involves very important
health issues. The latter have become very obvious in
Curaçao where serious cases of heavy pollution have been
reported. So, this might or should be a human right that
we would want to consider as a candidate for our
constitution.
Surprisingly, some of the most fundamental human rights
as laid down in the two important general human rights
treaties, the International Covenant and the European
Convention of Human Rights, both in force in our isles,
are not mentioned in our draft constitution, probably
because they are not mentioned in the Dutch
constitution. I am referring, inter alia, to the
right to life
and the right not to be subjected to torture, or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
I do not have to remind you that these rights are not
always being adhered to in the Dutch Caribbean.
Another
right that at least should be considered as a candidate
for our constitution is the prohibition of slavery and
of slave-trade in all their forms.
Apart from the fact that this fundamental right has
lately gotten new dimensions, a country that has gone
through the evils of slavery and slave-trade would be
wise to remind itself of these sad and wicked times in
order to foster a general conviction that those days
should never be forgotten and should never return. It is
significant that most independent Caribbean States have
enshrined these particular fundamental rights in their
respective constitutions.
The
fundamental right to education as expressed in the Dutch
constitution has a very peculiar twist in that it
fosters both public-authority schools and denominational
schools. I do not mind that we copy this very peculiar
arrangement as long as we realize that this provision
results from fundamental, and typically Dutch,
discussions that have still not ended.
As a general rule, however, I think we would be better
off copying the structure of the human rights as worded
in the Human Rights treaties, although we might consider
sharpening them here and there.
I say this
because by following the structure of the human rights
as formulated in those treaties we will make it clear
for ourselves that most of these rights are not without
limitations. Lawyers and judges of course are, or should
be, familiar with this phenomenon, but for the ordinary
citizen this is not always the case. By transplanting
the structure of those fundamental rights that we have
decided to admit into the Hall of Fame of our
constitution into its text we will bring home to all of
us not only which of these rights may be limited but
also how and under what conditions. At the same time it
will be clear to all that there can be no derogation
from some of these rights (like the right not to be
subjected to torture or cruel or degrading treatment).
That is also good to know.
Using this
structure we will further make it clear that the rights
as expressed in our constitution are inextricably linked
to those in the treaties which will invite our judges to
tap in into the jurisprudence of Human Rights courts
while interpreting our domestic constitution. Although
it is true that the courts are already using this
jurisprudence and are in fact compelled to do so, there
is still an important difference. By bringing the human
rights down from the high heavens of international law
to the earthly sphere of our own constitution we have in
fact made these rights our very own while at the same
time acknowledging that we are part of a bigger world,
bigger even than this “huge” Kingdom of ours.
This
approach will also bring home that limitations of these
fundamental rights, if at all possible, can only be
lawfully imposed if they are provided or prescribed by
law and if they are necessary in a democratic society
for one or more of the legitimate purposes defined in
the provisions concerned. The Dutch constitution, and in
its footsteps the draft constitution of Curaçao, usually
only mentions the first condition but that is clearly
not sufficient. Using European case law when
interpreting the constitution will therefore refine and
enhance our understanding of these fundamental rights.
In accordance with that case law it is not enough if the
statute simply allows certain infringements of the right
concerned even if those infringements are proportionate
and for legitimate purposes.
The
requirement to provide or prescribe these limitations by
law also relates, according to the European Court of
Human Rights, to the quality of the law, requiring it to
be compatible with the rule of law.” This means that
when the law allows certain infringements of the
fundamental right it should be so structured that it
provides adequate legal safeguards against abuse and
that, where the law confers a power of discretion to the
authorities, the law should also “indicate the scope of
that discretion.”
It is thus that the Courts if conferred with the power
of full judicial review would be able to protect and
uphold the rights of the citizens.
By
transforming treaty rights into constitutional rights
another valuable development may ensue. “Monist”
thinkers that we are, we never realize that not only
does international human rights law influence our
domestic law but interpretation of domestic fundamental
rights may also very well affect international case law.
This is so because of what we call the margin of
appreciation that is allowed to the individual states to
conceptualize and implement these rights. The
development of human rights law is in a sense a two-way
street, at least more than we think.
Bringing
human rights home and taking ownership of them also
entails that we confront ourselves with the question
under which circumstances we might be relieved from the
duty to observe and honor these rights. In the recent
past it has regularly occurred that pressured by the
populace and certain media politicians have sought to
find excuses to suspend some of the fundamental rights
by declaring a quasi state of emergency or purporting to
pretend that such a state in fact existed. It has also
been a popular theme during election time. Whenever
crime is on the rise utterances like these are heard.
Although these statements are reject able and
irresponsible, it is easy for them to be made because
our current constitution does not even mention the power
to declare a state of emergency so that nobody really
knows what the politician is talking about.
It is a
positive development that the draft constitution seeks
to fill that gap by introducing a section 91 in which
some features of declaring a state of emergency are
outlined. It is also positive that the draft makes clear
that only a limited number of fundamental rights may be
departed from: the freedom of the press, the right of
association and assembly and also the inviolability of
the home and the right to privacy of correspondence. The
proposed section also makes mention of the requirement
for an official proclamation of the state of emergency.
It is, however, silent on such important principles as
the principle of exceptional threat, strict necessity
and international notification. In other words,
declaring some state of emergency in case of rising
crime is out of the question, at any rate if the
government (even with the support of parliament) would
want to succumb to pressures from groups advocating the
suspension of some inconvenient rights.
It is
especially in hard times and difficult situations that
we can test how true we are to our fundamental values
and principles. Compared with the situation in the state
of Israel our own difficulties are really child’s play.
Nevertheless, many times the Israeli Supreme Court stood
its ground. Aharon Barak, the former President of that
Court once discussed this in a judgment in which his
Court held that violent interrogation of a suspected
terrorist is not lawful, even if doing so may save human
life by preventing impending terrorist acts ( a “ticking
bomb” situation). He held:
“We are
aware that this decision does not make it easier to deal
with that reality. This is the fate of democracy, as not
all means are acceptable to it, and not all methods
employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes a
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back.
Nonetheless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule
of law and the recognition of individual liberties
constitute an important component of its understanding
of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its
spirit and strength and allow it to overcome its
difficulties.”
And he
divulged:
“Deciding
these applications has been difficult for us. True, from
the legal perspective, the road before us is smooth. We
are, however, part of Israeli society. We know its
problems and we live its history. We are not in an ivory
tower. We live the life of this country. We are aware of
the harsh reality of terrorism in which we are, at
times, immersed. The fear that our ruling will prevent
us from properly dealing with terrorists troubles us.
But we are judges. We demand that others act according
to the law. This is also the demand that we make of
ourselves. When we sit at trial, we stand on trial.”
The two
major arguments brought forward against full judicial
review in the Dutch Caribbean are that this would form a
break with Dutch legal tradition and that most of our
judges are “not from here” or, to put it more precise
are “European whites” so that a shift of power towards
the judges might be perceived as a reintroduction of
some form of colonialism.
It would
take me a lecture in itself to seriously deal with those
arguments but I am already talking too long and as I
must have mercy on your souls I will not seek to exhaust
you. Let me just make two points. Tradition is never a
real argument. If it was, the world would look very
differently. Talking of breaking with tradition: all the
independent countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean, all
former colonies of Britain, got their independence upon
condition that they would have a written constitution
being the supreme law of the land and imbued with the
principle of the separation of powers charging the
judiciary with the duty to review the constitutionality
of all laws and governmental acts. This “package” was
demanded by England who herself did not even have a
written constitution or judicial review of statutes (as
is still the case).
As to the
second point, I would like to say the following. It has
to be accepted by all politicians, current and future,
that they must be closely monitored in the way they ply
their trade. This is not just a demand made by the Dutch
government, it has also and more importantly so been
demanded by the people. Even the report of drs. Caryl
Monte who at the time was hailed as the saviour of the
country by those that vehemently opposed the “final
declaration” pertaining to the new constitutional
structure of the Antilles suggested that the politicians
should be put under strict supervision of new and old
local institutions, virtually sidelining the parliament.
But even
these institutions would need a final back up from the
Courts and so the choice, to put it bluntly, is this:
should our politicians be supervised by Dutch judges or
Dutch politicians and bureaucrats. I would choose the
judges as they are at least bound by our laws and for
many more reasons. But that is perhaps for another time.
At the end
of the day, however, this is not about judges. It is
about us, the people. It is about our right to
self-determination.
Let me end
with the following citation:
“..because human rights enable and legitimize the free
choice of , the individual, they strengthen the dominant
structure of modern society, which is based upon free
inclusion and individual mobility… As such, human rights
constitute the unnoticed and elementary condition for
participation within modern society. Human rights enable
us, without paying further heed, to take part in the
richness of social roles, networks, associations and
organizations that make up modern societies.” (G.
Verschraegen, ‘Human Rights and Modern Society: A
Sociological Analysis from the Perspective of Systems
Theory’ (2002)
And so,
members of the DCHRC, here it is. There is work to do, a
lot of work in all fields. There will be fiery debates,
there will be uneasy silence. There will be enthusiasm,
there will be unwillingness. There will be victories,
there will be defeats. There will be applause and there
will be resistance. You are a group that might be
destined to take the lead in discussing the difficult
issues of human rights and by having them debated
enlighten the people.
There is
still a long way to go and it will take perseverance and
courage to continue on the journey you have now embarked
upon.
I trust
that you will keep the faith and that you will stand
tall. I wish you well in your endeavours. I wish our
countries well in our quest for maturity and justice.
I thank
you.
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